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By Carl E. B. McKenry*
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act1 (ADEA). The purpose of the ADEA was to protect
workers within the prescribed age limits from employment dis-
crimination based on their age. To effectuate this goal, President
Carter formulated Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978,2 the major
impact of which was to transfer enforcement functions under the
ADEA from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commissions (EEOC).
This Article examines the enforcement of the ADEA and other
federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination on the ba-
sis of age, focusing specifically on procedural considerations. Cen-
tral to this theme is the impact of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1978 upon the enforcement of the ADEA. While prohibitions of
age discrimination in employment generally may be categorized
into one of two substantive and procedural areas--discrimination
in the private sector and discrimination in the government-this
Article primarily considers the prohibition of discriminatory em-
ployment practices in the private sector. Because the substantive
* Dean, School of Business Administration, University of Miami. A.B., 1949, University
of Miami; J.D., 1954, University of Miami; LL.M., 1962, University of Miami; LL.M., 1965,
New York University.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
2. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app., at 354 (Supp. HI 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reorganiza-
tion Plan]. Because of its significance in the enforcement of the ADEA, the full text of the
Reorganization Plan and the Presidential Transmission Message are reprinted as Appendix
A to this Article.
3. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, §§ 1-2. The Reorganization Plan also included
the transfer of responsibility for enforcing the laws prohibiting employment discrimination
by the federal government from the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC. Id. §§ 3-4.
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aspects of the ADEA are inextricably interwoven with the enforce-
ment policies that are the focus of this Article, and because an un-
derstanding of the legislative history helps to illuminate congres-
sional intent regarding enforcement policy and procedures, the
Article begins with a discussion of the initial legislation, the Reor-
ganization Plan, the regulatory modifications made in response to
the Plan, and changes likely to occur in the future.
The Substantive Legislation
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
Various theories have been suggested to explain the seemingly
arbitrary selection of age sixty-five as the original standard for re-
tirement under the Social Security Act.4 The most plausible theory
traces the standard back to the Old Age and Survivors Pension Act
drafted in 1889 by Otto von Bismark, the first chancellor of the
German Empire.5 Regardless of the standard's origin, once estab-
lished within the United States social security system it provided a
convenient upper limit for protection under any act proscribing
employment discrimination based on age.
- Although proposed legislation to promote and protect employ-
ment of the older worker was introduced as early as the 1950's, it
languished in congressional committees until the 1960's. Included
in the debate over what ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of
19646 was some consideration of establishing a protected class
based on age. A compromise eventually was reached that excluded
any age-based class from the Civil Rights Act's protected classes,
but requested that a study be prepared for Congress by the Secre-
tary of Labor on the subject of age discrimination in employment.
The Secretary's report found widespread discriminatory practices7
and served as a catalyst for the ultimate passage of the ADEA in
1967.8
4. 49 Stat. 622 (1935).
5. See HOUSE SELECT Comm. ON AGING, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., MANDATORY RETIRE-
MENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS (Comm. Pub. No. 95-91, 1977);
S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
525 (remarks of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
6. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
7. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 415 OF THE CiWL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
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The Supreme Court, in Lorillard v. Pons,9 described the
ADEA as "something of a hybrid," reflecting a congressional desire
to use the existing statutory scheme but at the same time to pro-
vide adjustment when the present legislation had proven inade-
quate or was considered inappropriate. 10 The ADEA's enforcement
provisions rely in large measure upon sections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193811 (FLSA) and the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act
of 1947,12 but reflect a "willingness to depart from those provisions
regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation." 18 This
led Justice Marshall to observe that "[t]he enforcement scheme for
the statute is complex-the product of considerable attention dur-
ing the legislative debates preceding passage of the Act."
As originally enacted, the responsibility for the enforcement of
the ADEA was placed in the Secretary of Labor, with the power,
after meeting specified administrative prerequisites, to bring ac-
tions for monetary and injunctive relief.15 As part of the enforce-
ment function, the Secretary was authorized to make investiga-
tions and to require appropriate recordkeeping by employers. 16
The Act also provided the employee, as well as the Secretary of
Labor, with a private right of action in the courts.1
7
Fair Labor Standards Act Amendment of 1974
The 1974 amendments to the FLSA expressly extended the
provisions of the ADEA to all employers with twenty or more em-
ployees and to state and local governments and their related agen-
cies.18 The amended FLSA also set forth an express federal govern-
ment policy against discrimination on the basis of age for its
employees and empowered the United States Civil Service Con-
& AD. NEws 2213, 2214. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HIv. L. Rsv. 380 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Discrimination Note]; Note, Age
Discrimination in Employment: The Problems of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383,
384-88 (1966).
9. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
10. Id. at 578.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). See 434 U.S. at 581.
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976). See 434 U.S. at 581 n.8.
13. 434 U.S. at 581.
14. Id. at 577.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
16. Id. § 626(a).
17. Id. § 626(c) (Supp. II 1979).
18. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1967)).
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mission to enforce that policy.'9
1978 Amendments to the ADEA
In 1977, the Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mc-
Mann20 held that section 4(f)(2)21 of the ADEA permitted manda-
tory retirement prior to age sixty-five pursuant to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement or a pension plan, so long as such
agreement or plan was not intended as a "subterfuge" of the Act.
22
Partly in reaction to the decision in McMann and partly to com-
plete an unfinished agenda, both procedural and substantive
amendments were made to the ADEA in 1978. Section 2(b) of the
ADEA amendments overturned the Court's ruling in McMann by
amending paragraph (2) of section 4(f) to exclude from the excep-
tion for a bona fide employee benefit plan provisions that would
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any employee be-
cause of age.2 3 Furthermore, section 12 was revised to raise the up-
per limit of coverage from age sixty-five to age seventy24 and to
add exemptions for high level executives based upon their level of
retirement income.2 5 A temporary exemption for tenured faculty at
institutions of higher education under which mandatory retirement
at age sixty-five could be imposed was also added.6
The 1978 amendments to the ADEA also contain several pro-
cedural changes. Section 7(d)27 originally required that a com-
plaining individual give the Department of Labor notice of intent
to file suit within 180 days of the occurrence of the unlawful prac-
tice. The amendment28 extended the period for giving notice to 300
days when the alleged unlawful practice occurs in a state that pro-
hibits age discrimination in employment and vests authority in a
local agency to grant or seek relief against such unlawful discrimi-
19. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976)).
20. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. IM
1979)).
22. 434 U.S. at 203.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. m1 1979).
24. Id. § 631(a). The amendment took effect on January 1, 1979. Id.
25. Id. § 631(c). The exemption is premised on an actual level of retirement compensa-
tion of $27,000 annually. Id.
26. Id. § 631(d).
27. Id. § 626(d)(2) (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (Supp. In 1979)).
28. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 189.
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nation.29 The amendments also provided for the tolling of the stat-
ute of limitations for up to one year if, during that period, the De-
partment of Labor made informal attempts to secure voluntary
compliance.30 Other changes effected by the amendments include
adding a right to a jury trial of any issue of fact s and substituting
a requirement that a party must file a simple "charge '82 for the
"notice of intent to sue" requirement.
The EEOC-Structure and Authority
Authority for the basic structure and enforcement powers of
the EEOC is found in sections 70533 and 706" of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 s1 (Title VII), which established the EEOC as a five-
member, independent commission appointed by the President.
Among the paramount considerations in the 1963 debates over the
proposed Title VII legislation were the enforcing agency's form
and structure. On the one hand, the Senate proposal urged crea-
tion of a specific agency under the Secretary of Labor with author-
ity to file complaints with an "Equal Employment Opportunity
Board" similar to the National Labor Relations Board.38 The
House of Representatives, on the other hand, preferred a weak en-
forcement agency with limited powers of investigation, interpreta-
tion, and conciliation.3 7 Under the House proposal, any further en-
forcement action would-be effected through civil litigation initiated
by the injured party.38 In order to obtain passage of a civil rights
29. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (Supp. 1I 1979). See also id. § 633(b) (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2)
(1976)).
31. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)
(1976)).
32. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976)).
Apparently, a document identifying the potential defendant and generally alleging an un-
lawful discriminatory practice is sufficient. H.R. CoNF. Rm. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
12, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 528, 534. See Sheeder, Procedural
Complexity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: An Age-Old Problem, 18 DUQ.
L. RE V. 241, 243 (1980).
Despite the changes effected by the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, some commenta-
tors believe that a number of unresolved problems with enforcement of the ADEA remain.
See, e.g., id. at 243, 270.
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
34. Id. § 2000e-5.
35. Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6 (1976 & Supp. 1m 1979).
36. See M. PLAYER, EMLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 214-15 (1980).
37. Id.
38. Id.
May 1981] LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT
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statute, the weaker House proposal was adopted as the bipartisan
compromise, thus establishing the initial structure of the EEOC.
The substantive rights subject to EEOC enforcement are de-
scribed in sections 70339 and 70440 of Title VII. The recognized
purpose of the EEOC is to assure "equality of employment oppor-
tunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' "
Originally, two separate procedural routes were established to
carry out the substantive intent of the Title VII legislation: au-
thority to prosecute individual cases of employment discrimination
was vested in the EEOC and authority to prosecute cases of em-
ployment discrimination evidenced by an organization's employ-
ment patterns or practices was given jointly to the Attorney Gen-
eral and the EEOC.
4 2
Reflecting a changed political climate, as well as intervening
judicial decisions, the EEOC's enforcement powers were expanded
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.48 In addition
to giving the EEOC power to file suits, the 1972 Act lengthened
the limitation periods for filing charges with the EEOC and for
filing a private court action if EEOC conciliation efforts failed."
Initially, an increasing backlog of cases created the widespread
perception that the EEOC was overburdened. 45 In the last two
years, however, efforts have been made to improve staffing and to
render the EEOC's operations more effective .4  Whether these
changes will result in better performance over the long range, par-
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
40. Id. § 2000e-3.
41. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
42. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 707-708, 78 Stat. 259-61 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to 2000e-6 (1976 & Supp. mI 1979)). See generally Willborn, Public Sec-
tor Pattern Or Practice Enforcement Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 31 LAB.
L.J. 27 (1980).
43. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972).
44. Id.
45. See 113 CONG. R.c. 31,254 (1967) (remarks of Senator Jacob K. Javits); Leap &
Kovarsky, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act: A Proposed Consolidation, 31 LAB. L.J. 13, 23 (1980).
46. See Oversight Hearings on Federal Enforcement of REO Laws: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and La-
bor, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 2, 68 (1979) (statement of Eleanor Holmes Norton) [hereinafter
cited as Oversight Hearings]. Over a period of two years the EEOC extensively revised its
procedural and enforcement regulations and reorganized its headquarters and .field office
structures. See 44 Fed. Reg. 4667 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 30,798 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 55,388
(1977); id. at 47,828.
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ticularly in light of the EEOC's increased responsibilities, remains
to be determined.
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978
Passage of the Plan
The Reorganization Act of 1977 47 authorizes presidential plans
to reorganize the structure of agencies within the executive branch
of government. Generally, the President is authorized, within cer-
tain statutory limits, to propose specific structural changes. 48 Any
presidential proposal is transmitted to Congress in which either
house may pass a resolution of disapproval. If such a resolution is
not issued within sixty calendar days from transmittal during a
continuous session of Congress, the reorganization plan goes into
effect.
Pursuant to the Reorganization Act, on February 23, 1978,
President Carter submitted his Reorganization Plan No. 1 (Plan)
to Congress. The Plan reallocated power among the agencies re-
sponsible for enforcement of the laws prohibiting employment dis-
crimination, largely favoring an expanded EEOC with a reduced
role for the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commis-
sion.49 Although resolutions opposing the Plan were proposed in
both the Senate"0 and the House, 51 neither resolution was adopted.
Consequently, the Plan was officially published on May 9, 1978.
The Plan provides for six transfers of enforcement authority
between executive agencies. Section 1 transfers the responsibility
for enforcement of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 from the Depart-
ment of Labor to the EEOC.52 Section 2 transfers similar functions
under the ADEA from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC.53 Sec-
47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (Supp. 11 1979).
48. Under § 903(a), the President's plan may provide for: "(1) the transfer of the
whole or a part of an agency, or of whole or a part of the functions thereof, to the jurisdic-
tion and control of another agency; [or] (3) the consolidation or coordination of the whole or
a part of an agency, or of the whole or a part of the functions thereof, with the whole or a
part of another agency or the functions thereof .... See notes 59-61 & accompanying text
infra.
49. See Reorganization Plan, supra note 2.
50. S. Res. 404, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. R c. 2315 (1978).
51. H.R. Res. 1049, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 1522 (1978).
52. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 1. Sections 1 and 2 became effective on July
1, 1979. Section 3 became effective on October 1, 1978, and § 6 on July 1, 1978.
53. Id.
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tion 3 transfers enforcement of equal opportunity in federal em-
ployment laws from the Civil Service Commission to the EEOC."
Section 4 transfers to the EEOC the Civil Service Commission's
responsibility55 to enforce laws requiring federal employment of
handicapped individuals. 56 Section 5 transfers the EEOC's power
to initiate litigation under section 707 of Title VII with respect to
state or local government employment practices (so-called "pattern
or practice" suits) back to the Attorney General.57 Section 6 trans-
fers the functions of the Equal Opportunity Employment Coordi-
nating Council to the EEOC.58
The transfers that primarily affect enforcement of the age dis-
crimination in employment laws appear to be well within the scope
of presidential authority under the Reorganization Act. The Act's
grant of authority to transfer functions from one executive agency
to another is subject, however, to some express limitations. 59 The
validity of Section 6 of the Plan, and its implementing Executive
Order,60 may be challenged in the future as exceeding presidential
authority under the Act, which states:
A reorganization plan may not provide for, and a reorganiza-
tion... may not have the effect of-(1) creating a new executive
department, abolishing or transferring an executive department
or independent regulatory agency, or all the functions thereof, or
consolidating two or more executive departments or two or more
independent regulatory agencies, or all the functions thereof
61
Implementation of the Reorganization Plan
Implementing the Plan involved a combination of Executive
Orders and revisions to the Code of Federal Regulations. Substan-
tial modification of the regulations concerning enforcement proce-
54. Id.§3.
55. The Commission's enforcement responsibility was authorized by the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, § 501, 87 Stat. 390 (1973).
56. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 4.
57. Id. § 5. The President's authority to transfer the powers of the EEOC with respect
to public sector pattern or practice enforcement to the Attorney General has been ques-
tioned. See Wiborn, Public Sector Pattern or Practice Enforcement Under Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 1 of 1978, 31 LAB. L.J. 27 (1980).
58. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 5.
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 905(a)(1)-(6) (Supp. 1I 1979).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,067, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1979 Compilation).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 905(a)(1) (Supp. 1I 1979). For a more complete discussion of the issue
of presidential authority for this transfer, see notes 132-53 & accompanying text infra.
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dures was necessary in order to effectuate the transfer of the pri-
mary enforcement responsibility to the EEOC. Unlike the EEOC,
which conducts its Title VII actions pursuant to procedural and
substantive regulations, the Wage and Hour Division of the De-
partment of Labor operates under its own "Field Operation Hand-
book. ' 62 The Handbook is not as readily available to the public,
particularly potentially concerned employers, as is a regulation,
which must appear in draft and proposed form in the Federal Reg-
ister and is ultimately published in the Code of Federal
Regulations. s
The Department of Labor has established two titles in the
Code of Federal Regulations governing certain aspects of its re-
sponsibilities under the ADEA." The public transfer of these
ADEA-related provisions and other procedural or operational mat-
ters from the Department of Labor to the EEOC was accomplished
through Executive Order No. 12,144,5 which provided for the
transfer of equal pay and age discrimination in employment en-
forcement functions pursuant to the Reorganization Plan. In ef-
fecting the transfer, the EEOC adopted by regulation, on a tempo-
rary basis, the "Interpretations and Opinion Letters" of the
Department of Labor, as well as the "recordkeeping requirements
and administrative exemption provisions of the Department of La-
bor as set forth in 29 CFR Part 850.''6e
The transfer of responsibility for enforcement litigation under
the ADEA among the Office of General Counsel, the EEOC, and
the Department of Labor's Office of the Solicitor was accomplished
by an EEOC regulation adopting the "Memorandum of Under-
standing Concerning Transfer of Equal Pay and Age Discrimina-
62. See Marshall v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 479 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
63. See Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 376 (8th Cir. 1974). As origi-
nally enacted, § 9 of the ADEA provided that "the Secretary of Labor may issue such rules
and regulations as he may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter,
and may establish such reasonable exemptions to and from any or all provisions of this
chapter, as he may find necessary and proper in the public interest." 81 Stat. 605 (1967).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 850 (1979) (records to be made or kept relating to age, notices to
be posted, and administrative exemptions). The interpretations in 29 C.F.R. § 860 (1979)
provide "a practical guide to the employers as to how the office representing the public
interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138
(1944).
65. 3 C.F.R. 404 (1980 Compilation).
66. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974-75 (1979). The provisions were adopted by the EEOC as 29
C.F.R. § 1627 (1979) and republished i* their entirety at 44 Fed. Reg. 38,459 (1979).
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tion Enforcement to EEOC" as the basic transfer document."7 The
basic transfer procedure was to divide pending legal matters into
three areas: trial litigation, appellate litigation, and other matters.
Effective transfer dates were assigned to each area, and training,
legal analysis, or briefing were provided as appropriate.
In November, 1979, the EEOC published proposed interpreta-
tions and interpretative guidelines6 8 that represent a major devia-
tion from previous enforcement philosophy. While basically serving
only to renumber the Department of Labor's age discrimination in-
terpretations, 69 these proposals also contain the following state-
ment by the EEOC: "It is the Commission's position that these
proposed interpretations be interpreted in a manner which is con-
sistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commis-
sion has deleted many of the examples contained in the Depart-
ment of Labor Interpretations."" ° The impact of this shift in
interpreting ADEA requirements towards conformity with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act may be the most significant short-range
result of the reorganization. 1
A Title VII Approach to Enforcement
Apart from the physical reorganization and attendant fiscal
and personnel problems,1 2 certain changes of a philosophical na-
67. 44 Fed. Reg. 39,304 (1979).
68. Id. at 68,858 (1979).
69. The guidelines renumbered 29 C.F.R. § 860 as 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1979).
70. 40 Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979).
71. See notes 73-128 & accompanying text infra.
72. EEOC Chairperson Norton described the physical transfer of Equal Pay Act and
ADEA enforcement functions: "The function came with 319 positions, including 68 from the
Solicitor's Office. Of these, approximately 280 are field positions. Only 27 of this number
represent positions that were devoted full-time to the functions .... We were particularly
gratified at the large number of Wage and Hour employees who chose to come, including
virtually all the supervisors.... We are committed to maintaining both Age and Equal Pay
as separate and distinct functions during the initial period of our jurisdiction....
"The Department of Labor has formally agreed to contmiue to take charges and com-
plaints at its 300 locations throughout the country and to forward them to the Commission.
Our data systems have been revised to track these referrals." Oversight Hearings, supra
note 46, at 56 (remarks of Eleanor Holmes Norton). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 37,974, 37,975
(1979).
Transfers of funds, either unexpended balances of appropriations or funds available or
to be made available to the original agencies affected by the Plan, followed the transfer of
specific functions to the appropriate new departments. Absent a special allocation of funds,
it may be reasonable to conclude that no major reorganization apart from the present divi-
sion of functions along statutory lines between the ADEA and Title VII is imminent.
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ture can be expected from the transfer of ADEA functions to the
EEOC. Perhaps the most comprehensive and pervasive of these
will be the interpretation of all statutes under EEOC authority in
accordance with concepts developed under Title VII.
7
3
Legislative authority for the EEOC's attempts at uniform in-
terpretation of Title VII and the ADEA is far from absolute.74
Noting that the ADEA's substantive provisions are identical in
many respects to the language of Title VII, some courts have
held that the two statutes may be interpreted without differentia-
tion.71 Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, while recogniz-
ing the similarity of language and common purpose of the laws,
were less clear about the extent to which similarity of treatment is
appropriate.
7 6
Fundamental to the argument for distinguishing ADEA from
Title VII interpretation is the finding that "[a]ge discrimination is
not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race or creed
prejudices and bigotry. '7 7 Age discrimination is unique because
sooner or later (if one survives) everyone becomes a member of the
protected class. 78 Additionally, at some point, age discrimination
necessarily involves relative differences of ability to perform on the
job. Discrimination against individuals within the protected classes
under Title VII, however, can be founded upon feelings of hostility
73. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 46, at 82 (remarks of Eleanor Holmes Norton)
(indicating the belief that it is also appropriate to bring the handicapped within the classifi-
cation of protected groups under Title VII); 44 Fed. Reg. 63,358 (1979). See also notes 68-70
& accompanying text supra.
74. Convincing reasons have been advanced for interpreting the provisions of the
ADEA by focusing on the particular problems present in age discrimination cases rather
than automatically applying Title VII precedents to the ADEA. See Liddle, Disparate
Treatment Claims under ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 5
EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 549 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Liddle]; Discrimination Note, supra
note 8.
75. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 263
(1980).
76. See Oscar Mayer Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 584 (1978).
77. 113 CONG. REc. 34,742 (1967) (remarks of Representative Burke).
78. See Liddle, supra note 74, at 551. Professor Liddle advocates the "judicial devel-
opment of a body of truly distinct ADEA law and less reliance on Title VII case law." Id. at
550. Another commentator concludes: "While the language of the ADEA may be identical to
that of Title VII in most respects, the problems of age, race, and sex discrimination are not.
As a result, in resolving these questions under the ADEA, courts would do well to avoid
automatic applications of Title VII precedents and to look instead more carefully to the
distinctive aspects of age discrimination." Discrimination Note, supra note 8, at 411.
May 1981] LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT
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or upon prejudicial behavior towards absolute and immutable
characteristics of certain groups.7 1 The features that make age dis-
crimination distinguishable from discrimination against tradition-
ally protected classes are reflected in the procedural provisions of
ADEA, which direct enforcement in accordance with the "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of the FLSA. 0 Although the Supreme
Court as well as lower courts have observed the similarity of sub-
stantive aspects of the ADEA and Title VII,a1 in Lorillard v.
Pons"2 the Court found significant differences in the "remedial and
procedural provisions of the two laws," which reflect the congres-
sional intent to distinguish between the two statutes.8Inasmuch as the nature of the discrimination prohibited under
the ADEA is substantively distinguishable from that prohibited
under Title VII, and the intent of Congress in enacting the ADEA
was not identical with the congressional intent underlying Title
VII," it is most difficult to find a basis for the melding of enforce-
ment philosophies and interpretations by EEOC. Nonetheless, in
the absence of congressional, judicial, or presidential intervention,
certain specific procedural changes or, at the very least, shifts in
emphasis can be expected as a result of the EEOC's position. The
following discussion examines the likely areas of discernible impact
by the reorganization.
Burden of Proof
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,85 the Supreme Court
set forth certain standards regarding the burden of proof and the
evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
79. See Discrimination Note, supra note 8, at 384. It should also be noted that the
Secretary of Labor's Report indicated that "no evidence of prejudice based on dislike or
intolerance for the older worker" was found. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF TE CIVIL RIGrs ACT OF
1964 at 6 (1965).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
81. See notes 75-76 & accompanying text supra.
82. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
83. Id. at 583-85.
84. Unlike the ADEA, which is designed to prohibit individual instances of discrimina-
tion, the legislative and political history surrounding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
evinces an intention that Title VII be used to effect broad social changes. Not surprisingly,
Title VII has been viewed as an instrument of social reform and economic egalitarianism.
See A. MCCULLOCH, SELECTING EMPLOYEaES SAFELY UNDER THE LAw (1981) [hereinafter cited
as MCCULLOCH].
85. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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in Title VII litigation."" The applicability of McDonnell Douglas to
ADEA cases is not clear because the Court has subsequently indi-
cated that the McDonnell Douglas standard was not intended to
be inflexible or universally applicable to every fact situation. 7
However, in a recent case involving the allocation of the bur-
den of proof in a Title VII gender discrimination, disparate treat-
ment case, 8 the Court sought to clarify McDonnell Douglas and in
doing so made a specific, favorable reference to Loeb v. Textron,89
an age discrimination case decided by the First Circuit. Assuming
by this reference that the Court holds the same burden of proof
requirements to apply in Title VII and ADEA cases, the fact that a
right to a jury trial is specifically provided under ADEA by the
1978 amendments,90 with no equivalent option available under Ti-
tle VII, constitutes a substantial procedural distinction which, be-
cause of the necessary element of instruction to the jury, should
affect the applicability of McDonnell Douglas.91
In Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association 2 de-
cided before McDonnell Douglas, the Fifth Circuit ruled that in
ADEA cases the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant once
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. 3 In Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co.,9" however, the Sixth Circuit upheld a trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury that the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant upon a prima facie showing of discrimination by the
plaintiff.9 5 Although the reasoning of the Laugesen court has been
criticized, the court's refusal to incorporate and rely upon Title VII
evidentiary rules in an ADEA context has generally been
86. The Court's standards require the plaintiff to show (1) that he or she belongs to a
racial minority; (2) that he or she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite his or her qualifications, he or she was rejected; and
(4) that, after the rejection, the position remained open, and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of the plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802.
87. E.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977). See Liddle, supra note 74, at 552-55.
88. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 49 U.S.L.W. 4214 (1981).
89. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); see note 75 supra.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (p)(2) (Supp. 1I 1979).
91. See 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 263 (1980).
92. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 822.
94. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
95. Id. at 313.
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approved.96
A second problem area related to the allocation of the burden
of proof is the type of discrimination theory under which the fed-
eral government proceeds. In Title VII cases three basic theories
are available: the disparate treatment theory,97 the disparate im-
pact theory,' and the pattern or practice theory.99 As most ADEA
cases are individual actions, they generally fall under the disparate
treatment theory.100
Because of the EEOC's desire to interpret the ADEA and Ti-
tle VII uniformly, it may be anticipated that EEOC attorneys
eventually will try cases under both statutes. Such joinder of
claims is likely to have two results: (1) pressure for uniformity in
the elements of a prima facie case; and (2) expanded use of the
96. "The Laugeson court may have been correct in refusing to incorporate wholly Ti-
tie VII evidentiary rules into the ADEA context. While some deviation from the traditional
allocation of the burden of proof may be justified in actions brought under ADEA, the fac-
tors which support the Green decision-access to evidence, assumptions about normal be-
havior, and social policy-do not appear to apply with equal force to ADEA suits." Discrim-
ination Note, supra note 8, at 392. The issue of uniform procedural requirements and
standards in the enforcement of both Title VII and the ADEA is a continuing area of con-
cern. For a more detailed consideration of this matter, see 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 263, 268
n.34 (1980).
97. Sometimes referred to as the "one-on-one" employment decision, the disparate
treatment theory simply means that the employer treats some persons less favorably than
others for improper reasons such as race, sex, color, or age. See International Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See also M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 422 (1980); Nelson & Ward, Burdens of Proof Under Employment
Legislation, 6 J. C. & U.L. 301, 302 (1980).
98. This theory is generally applied in larger, usually class action, lawsuits and ad-
dresses primarily the consequences and impact of an employer's policies, guidelines, and
rules. Proof of an employer's discriminatory motive is irrelevant in disparate impact cases.
See Nelson & Ward, Burdens of Proof Under Employment Legislation, 6 J. C. & U.L. 301,
306 (1980). For cases applying the disparate impact theory, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. A "pattern or practice" of discrimination is a reference to the terminology in § 707
of Title VII. See 78 Stat. 261 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (Supp. I
1979)). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.16 (1977); Nelson & Ward, Burdens
of Proof under Employment Legislation, 6 J. C. & U.L. 301, 309 (1980).
100. One reason for the difficulty in bringing class actions under the ADEA has been
the "opt-in" requirement which allows only those individuals affirmatively giving notice that
they intended to file suit to participate as a member of a class alleging violation of the
ADEA's provisions. See Comment, Class Actions Under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act: The Question is "Why Not?," 23 EMORY L.J. 831 (1974). Additionally, most
ADEA cases deal with discharges rather than refusals to hire and, therefore, are more read-
ily handled under the disparate treatment theory. See Liddle, supra note 74, at 555.
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disparate impact theory and pattern or practice theory wherever
appropriate.10 1
Use of Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection in
ADEA Cases
The EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of
Justice, and the Department of Labor have jointly adopted the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 10 2 which
apply to most major federal equal opportunity statutes and orders,
except the ADEA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Depart-
ment of Labor's enforcement of the ADEA has been pursuant to
the Department's Field Operation Handbook, which provides the
reviewing officer with a ten-step "transactional analysis."103 Focus-
ing on isolated incidents of discriminatory practices, this approach
more readily lends itself to the disparate treatment theory than to
the disparate impact theory.
The EEOC's assumption of jurisdiction over ADEA cases
could result in a shift away from the "transactional analysis" ap-
proach in favor of the Uniform Guidelines.1" Because of the ten-
dency for ADEA cases to arise from "discharge" rather than "se-
lection" situations, 0 5 thus making them more amenable to the
more flexible transactional analysis approach, application of the
more rigid Guidelines to ADEA enforcement will constitute an un-
fortunate departure from present procedure.
Increased Use of Tandem Causes
An extremely important practice, which can be expected as
the EEOC becomes more adapted to ADEA enforcement responsi-
bility, is the use of tandem causes, which is similar to the joinder
of a Title VII cause with an ADEA cause when possible. 06 For ex-
101. See MCCULLOCH, supra note 84, at 16-17.
102. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
103. See McCULLOCH, supra note 84, at 48-50. See also note 63 supra. As to the weight
accorded the Department of Labor Field Operation Handbook, see Marshall v. Baptist
Hosp., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465, 479 (M.D. Tenn. 1979).
104. See MCCULLOCH, supra note 84, at 50.
105. See note 100 supra.
106. Eleanor Holmes Norton remarked: "[I]f you file an EPA case today, you can also
file a Title VII case, which gives you more than one basis. The effect on age discrimination
cases is going to be dramatic. Many, many people who came to EEOC should have been
filing age complaints and vice-versa, so we think the effect on enforcement is going to be
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ample, a Title VII complainant between the ages of forty and sev-
enty may be processed also on the basis of an ADEA claim, while
an ADEA complainant within a protected class under Title VII
also may be processed under that provision. This approach would
effectively give the EEOC a broader investigative and procedural
base because of variations between Title VII and the ADEA. 107
. Controversy presently exists in Title VII cases as to the extent
to which a complaint may be expanded. 08 In Sanchez v. Standard
Brands, Inc.,10 9 the Fifth Circuit held that "the 'scope' of the judi-
cial complaint is limited to the 'scope' of the EEOC investigation
which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of dis-
crimination."110 Thus, an increased use of tandem cases could have
most important and with the Labor Department still taking complaints, we are in fact not
reduced, but increased in the number of areas from which we can get complaints." Oversight
Hearings, supra note 46, at 85.
107. A comparison of investigative authority is helpful to an understanding of the
combined powers now residing in the EEOC, all of which can be applied to a tandem cause.
Section 709 of Title VII provides the EEOC with authority to require recordkeeping and to
undertake investigation of unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). In other situations, § 710 provides the EEOC with investigatory powers
under § 11 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1976). See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-g (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). The principal authority provided under § 11 of
the NLRA is access for examination and copying, to books and records that relate to any
matter under investigation or in question, plus subpoena powers requiring attendance and
testimony of witnesses or production of any evidence.
Section 7 of the ADEA provides authority for requiring recordkeeping, for investigation,
and for enforcement. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976 & Supp. In 1979). The EEOC's power to con-
duct investigations is based upon § 9 and § 11 of the FLSA. Id. §§ 209, 211. Section 9 of the
FLSA in turn makes reference to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1976), which relate
to the attendance of witnesses and the production of codes, papers, and documents. The
powers under § 9 thus are similar to powers under § 11 of the NLRA in regard to the
issuance of subpoenas. The authority under § 11 of the FLSA is far more extensive, how-
ever: "The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data
regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in any indus-
try subject to this chapter, and may enter and inspect such places and such records (and
make such transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts, con-
ditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine whether
any person has violated any provision of this chapter.... ." 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1976 & Supp.
11 1979). Moreover, § 7 of the ADEA incorporates §§ 16 (except the criminal liability provi-
sion in subsection (a)) and 17 of the FLSA. Id. § 626. Section 16 contains extensive enforce-
ment and penalty provisions, including liquidated damages in an amount equal to any un-
paid compensation, and § 17 provides authority for seeking injunctive relief in appropriate
circumstances. Id. §§ 216, 217.
108. It is generally held that the extent of a complaint filed in a Title VII action can
exceed the original charge on which the suit is based. See Vogt & Robles, Continuing Con-
troversy in Equal Employment Law, 6 J. C. & U.L. 291, 297 (1980).
109. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
110. Id. at 466. In view of the investigative potential in a combined Title VII and
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two consequences. First, including an age discrimination charge
with a Title VII charge at the onset would provide for a more ex-
tensive range of inquiry and ultimate judicial complaint. Second,
an ADEA charge could be added during the course of investigation
of a Title VII charge or, similarly, a Title VII charge could be ad-
ded during the course of investigation of an ADEA charge. A re-
cent article states the impact of the Reorganization Plan on the
scope of litigation issue succinctly: "[T]he changes in the Commis-
sion's authority significantly expand the potential claims which
could conceivably arise from a single charge of discrimination. Fur-
thermore, the exposure of employers charged initially with a single
form of discrimination can only increase if the more liberal charg-
ing rules prevail."111
It therefore will become extremely important for the defen-
dant, as much as possible, to keep the charges separated and to
attempt to preserve the procedural differences between Title VII
and the ADEA. Once the matter has reached the stage of a judicial
complaint, the body of investigative material that has been devel-
oped will be most difficult to exclude. Even at this point, however,
the statutory bases for the complaint should be kept distinct.
112
Potential Conflict of Interest Questions
As previously considered, the EEOC's initial concern was pri-
marily discrimination based upon race, national origin, or sex.
113
The recent transfer of enforcement responsibility for age discrimi-
nation in employment cases to the EEOC is not likely to diminish
its earlier zeal for eradicating employment discrimination directed
against those groups originally covered under Title VII. Conse-
quently, a potential intra-agency conflict of interest may arise in
certain cases in which a job vacancy is created by discrimination
based upon age and filled by a minority applicant or a woman.
ADEA action, see note 107 supra, this "scope" may extend or enlarge still further. The
Sixth Circuit, however, limited the complaint to those charges which were originally as-
serted unless they have a "common source." EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 451 (6th Cir.
1977).
111. Vogt & Robles, Continuing Controversy in Equal Employment Law, 6 J. C. &
U.L. 291, 298 (1980).
112. This may require appropriate action at the initial stages of litigation to require a
separation of counts or a more definite statement under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See Fn. R. Civ. P. 10(b), 12(e).
113. See note 41 & accompanying text supra.
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Although this concern presently may be only speculative, the
issue should be recognized and resolved. As the number of groups
under the EEOC's protective umbrella increases,""4 the potential
for conflicting claims or interests will be exacerbated until it ulti-
mately requires a regulatory or legislative mechanism for resolu-
tion."5 The issues involved in choosing between conflicting inter-
ests are top important and of too great a magnitude to permit the
regulatory body to determine policy. The political process of the
legislature is necessary to ensure the soundest and fairest decision.
Impact Upon the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Defense
Four affirmative defenses are made available to the employer
under section 4(f) of the ADEA: (1) that age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of the particular business; (2) that the disparate treatment
is based on reasonable factors other than age; (3) that age discrimi-
nation is necessary to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority
system or any bona fide employee benefit plan; and (4) that the
individual's discharge or discipline was for good cause." 6 The com-
mon ground for possible impact of the reorganization is the BFOQ
defense because of its availability under both Title VIP 7 and the
ADEA. Although the pertinent language of the two provisions is
identical," 8 the courts have applied the BFOQ defense differently
under Title VII and under the ADEA.
In Title VII cases, the BFOQ defense has been strictly and
narrowly construed.1 9 In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
114. It has been suggested that Title VII coverage should extend to prohibit discrimi-
nation in the employment of the handicapped. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 46, at 80
(remarks of Eleanor Holmes Norton). See also Leap & Kovarsky, The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act: A Proposed Consolidation, 31
LAB. L.J. 13 (1980) (advocating a merger of the two laws in order to equalize the level of
protection afforded older, handicapped workers).
115. As noted, age discrimination enforcement has been geared toward disparate treat-
ment cases, while Title VII enforcement has focused on the disparate impact and "pattern
or practice" approaches. See notes 97-100 & accompanying text supra. Moreover, a termi-
nated employee claiming age discrimination might very well be replaced by a member of
another protected group under an affirmative action plan.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976 & Supp. m1 1979).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1976).
118. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976) with 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1976).
119. See Player, Defenses under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misin-
terpretation, Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments, 12 GA. L. REv. 747, 752-54 (1977);
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Telegraph Co.,120 the Fifth Circuit, in the absence of convincing
supportive empirical data, rejected the argument that the duties of
a switchman were too "strenuous" for women as a class.' 21 Simi-
larly, the same court, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 22 held that a customer preference for female flight attendants
did not go to the "essence of the business operation" and therefore
would not form the basis for a BFOQ defense.
12 3
In ADEA cases, the BFOQ defense has been accepted more
readily. One reason that may help explain the more lenient appli-
cation of the defense under the ADEA is the fact that several of
the leading cases involved bus drivers or airline pilots, and thus
the issue of public safety.12 A second possible reason for the ap-
proach taken in ADEA cases involves the nature of the analysis
that must be undertaken. Not only must the court determine the
validity of the BFOQ with respect to the protected class, but if the
BFOQ is generally valid, the court must determine whether it is
valid with respect to subgroups within the class. In other words, a
second issue arises as to whether, within the protected class, the
age limit selected as a job qualification is the oldest that reasona-
bly could be established as an upper limit. It thus follows that a
greater degree of flexibility may be desirable in judicial considera-
Discrimination Note, supra note 8, at 400.
120. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
121. Id. at 235-36.
122. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
123. 442 F.2d at 388.
124. See, e.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodg-
son v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Although the Fifth Circuit upheld the BFOQ de-
fense in Usery, it relied on a sophisticated analytical technique praised by a recent commen-
tator. See Discrimination Note, supra note 8, at 405. But see Player, Defenses under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection, and the 1978
Amendments, 12 GA. L. REv. 747, 754-64 (1977) (BFOQ defense in Usery was "grossly mis-
interpreted and misapplied"). The public safety aspect has been considered in two leading
constitutionally-based actions. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976) (mandatory retirement at age 50 for a state police officer does not deny equal
protection); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding validity of qualifying test
administered to applicants for District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and
rejecting lower court's finding that disproportionate impact on blacks established institu-
tional violation). But see Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) (52 year old test pilot in defendant's employ remained with
the company in a different position, but the company was ordered to return him, if physical-
ly fit, to a test pilot position). See also Note, Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation:
Age Discrimination and Test Pilots, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 187 (1979).
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tion of the BFOQ defense in age discrimination cases. 12 5 An EEOC
shift towards uniformity of Title VII application in all employment
discrimination cases, however, may reduce flexibility, leading ulti-
mately to more limited recognition of the BFOQ defense in age
discrimination cases.
Other Procedural Considerations
Several recently published articles examine additional proce-
dural effects of the reorganization.'2  Among the most prominent
changes are the time limitations on the filing of a charge of dis-
crimination 12 7 and the "deferral to state agencies" requirement.lee
These items are not considered in detail here because, unlike those
considerations that may justify a distinction between Title VII and
ADEA enforcement procedures, they lend themselves to consolida-
tion and uniformity. Little argument exists to justify different time
limits for conciliation efforts or deferral to state agencies.
Coordination of Federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Programs and Other Related Matters
in the Plan
Transfer of Coordinating Council Functions
Although not directly related to the changes in ADEA enforce-
125. For an interesting extension of the "flexibility" approach that again demonstrates
the situational differences in age cases, see Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Neces-
sity and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 Ymx L.J. 565 (1979).
126. See Sheeder, Procedural Complexity of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: An Age-Old Problem, 18 DuQ. L. Rev. 241 (1980); Note, The Procedural Requirements
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 540 (1978).
127. A charge under the ADEA or Title VII must be filed within 180 days from the
date of the act complained of, except that a charge may be fied within 300 days if a state or
local agency prohibits the type of discrimination alleged. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (Supp. I1 1979)
(ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (Title VII). See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256
(10th Cir. 1976), affd mem. by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (time limitation
tolled until filing of notice of Intent to sue where employer's failure to provide information
contributed to investigator's failure to notify employee of her right to sue).
128. "[N]o suit may be brought. . . before the expiration of sixty days after proceed-
ings have been commenced under the State law. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976) (ADEA).
"[N]o charge may be filed under subsection (b) . . . by the person aggrieved before the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)(1976) (Title VII). See also Note, The Procedural Re-
quirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 RuT.-C s. L.J. 540,
551-52 (1978).
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ment, the abolition of the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordi-
nating Council and the transfer of its functions to the EEOC129 has
pervasive implications of both a substantive and a procedural na-
ture that affect ADEA enforcement.
The Council was established under section 715 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.130 Originally composed of the Secretary of La-
bor, the Chairperson of the EEOC, the Attorney General, the
Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission, and the Chairperson
of the Civil Rights Commission, the Council was to serve as a coor-
dinating authority to avoid conflict and promote efficiency among
the agencies involved. s The Council was abolished and its func-
tions transferred to the EEOC under section 6 of the Reorganiza-
tion Plan. 2
Following the transfer of the Council authority to the EEOC,
Executive Order No. 12,067, dated June 30, 1978, was issued.133
The Preamble, captioned "Providing for Coordination of Federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Programs," cites presidential au-
thority vested by the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, "including Section 9 of Reorganization Plan Number 1 of
1978," as the basis for issuance of the Order.13 4 Notwithstanding
such reliance, section 9 of the Reorganization Plan sheds little light
on the question of presidential authority other than the specifica-
tion of a tentative effective date and reference to 5 U.S.C. section
906, which merely specifies the effective, date and requires publica-
tion of reorganization plans.13 5
The issue of presidential authority for Executive Order No.
12,067 is pertinent because certain of its provisions significantly
expand EEOC authority. Under the Order, the responsibilities of
129. The scheme of the Reorganization Plan is reflected in the President's transmittal
message to Congress: "I am proposing today a series of steps to bring coherence to the equal
employment enforcement effort. These steps, to be accomplished by the Reorganization
Plan and Executive Orders, constitute an important step toward consolidation of equal em-
ployment opportunity enforcement.. . . Its experience and broad scope make the EEOC
suitable for the role of principal Federal agency in fair employment enforcement .... [The
Plan] gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-an agency dedicated solely to
this purpose-the primary Federal responsibility in the area of job discrimination. . .
Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 6.
130. 78 Stat. 265 (1964).
131. Id.
132. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 6.
133. 3 C.F.R. 206 (1979 Compilation).
134. Id.
135. Reorganization Plan, supra note 2, § 9.
May 1981] LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the EEOC are the following:
Specific Responsibilities.... [T]he Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission shall, where feasible: (a) develop uniform
standards, guidelines, and policies defining the nature of employ-
ment discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, age or handicap under all Federal statutes, Execu-
tive orders, regulations, and policies which require equal
employment opportunity; (b) develop uniform standards and pro-
cedures for investigations and compliance reviews to be con-
ducted by Federal departments and agencies under any Federal
statute, Executive order, regulation or policy requiring equal em-
ployment opportunity; ... (f) provide for the sharing of compli-
ance records, findings, and supporting documentation among
Federal departments and agencies responsible for ensuring equal
employment opportunity....
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall issue
such rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders as it deems
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this order. It shall
advise and offer to consult with the affected Federal departments
and agencies during the development of any proposed rules, regu-
lations, policies, procedures or orders. ... The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission shall use its best efforts to reach
agreement with the agencies on matters in dispute. Departments
and agencies shall comply with all final rules, regulations, policies,
procedures or orders of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.'
Reliance upon the Reorganization Plan itself as a source of au-
thority for the Order is difficult to sustain. The Plan contains no
reference to any additional authority to be vested in the EEOC
beyond the functions and authority of the Council existing by vir-
tue of section 715 of the Civil Rights Act. Even if such additional
authority were provided in the Plan, it would be subject to those
limitations of the Reorganization Act previously considered.18 7
Other potential sources of presidential authority for the Order,
whether express or implied, are necessarily restricted to constitu-
tional powers, grants through specific legislative enactments, and
congressional acquiescence. The President's constitutional powers
are found in article II of the Constitution, which vests the execu-
tive power in the President3 8 and charges the President to ensure
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978).
137. See notes 59-61 supra. See also 5 U.S.C. § 905(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1979).
138. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
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that the laws are faithfully executed.139 However, the synergistic
effect of the Reorganization Plan coupled with the series of Execu-
tive Orders, in particular Executive Order No. 12,067, results in
the creation of a new "super agency" which, it may be argued, goes
well beyond simple execution of existing laws and invades the con-
stitutional province of the legislative branch.
1 40
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 41 suggested that presidential actions
could be divided into three categories: (1) acting pursuant to ex-
press or implied authorization by Congress; (2) acting in the ab-
sence of congressional action, relying on independent presidential
powers; and (3) acting in a manner incompatible with the express
or implied will of Congress.1 42 Actions within the first category
clearly provide the President with maximum authority. 4 Illustra-
tive of this fact, most cases challenging presidential authority to
issue a particular executive order have ultimately depended upon
whether the express or implied statutory authorization for the
presidential action can be identified.1"
Notwithstanding the lack of any express congressional author-
ization, it may be possible to assert an implied basis for presiden-
tial authority to issue Executive Order No. 12,067. In a recent arti-
cle, Professor Bruff observed that "the President has a unique
responsibility to superintend the execution of many statutes at
once. I1 45 Discussing Chief Justice Vinson's dissent in Youngs-
town,146 Professor Bruff restates the argument that "the President
America. .. ." U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 1.
139. Id. § 3.
140. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Writing for
the majority in Youngstown, Justice Black stated that "the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitu-
tion limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Id. at 587.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 635-37.
144. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 485 F. Supp. 695 (D.Md. 1979) (de-
claratory action involving a thorough analysis of Executive Order No. 11,246).
145. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALz L.J. 451, 462
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Bruff].
146. The Chief Justice noted that "[u]nlike an administrative commission confined to
the enforcement of the statute under which it was created, or the head of a department
when administering a particular statute, the President is a constitutional officer charged
with taking care that a 'mass of legislation' be executed." 343 U.S. at 702 (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
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has some implied statutory or constitutional authority to harmo-
nize the welter of statutes, or to act interstitially at times,"
1 47
noting:
This argument... has a functional basis because legislation nec-
essarily distributes power in a somewhat fragmentary fashion,
and cannot resolve all the future problems of coordinating policy
under separate statutes.... The President has a unique vantage
point from which he can focus on a vital issue that falls within
the jurisdiction of a variety of executive and independent agen-
cies, each having power to deal with only part of the problem
1 48
Under the above approach, presidential authority to issue Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,067 would impliedly flow from the various
laws related to employment discrimination, 49 specific grants of
presidential authority under Title 5 of the United States Code,1 50
and the President's express authority over direct federal procure-
ment practices. 51 Indeed, Executive Order No. 11,246 was recently
upheld as action within presidential authority over federal pro-
curement and by implication under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.152 Professor Bruff also makes a strong case for finding an im-
147. Bruff, supra note 145, at 462.
148. Id.
149. E.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976); Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. 1m 1979); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979); Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
150. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 301, 3301, 7301 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
151. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a)(1976). See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 485 F.
Supp. 695, 709 (D.Md. 1979).
152. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 485 F. Supp. 695, 709 (D.Md. 1979)(re-
views the history of presidential use of Executive Orders and finds implied statutory author-
ity under the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to issue Executive Order
No. 11,246). For the purposes of this Article, it should be noted that Executive Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), prohibits discrimination by contractors doing
business with the federal government, but does not include age discrimination. In fact, prior
to promulgation of the Reorganization Plan, only one Executive Order dealing directly with
age discrimination can be found. See Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965 Com-
pilation). Executive Order No. 11,141 was considered briefly in AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d
784, 790 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and Kodish v. United Air Lines, 463 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Colo.
1979).
A recent student note makes an interesting case for the position that Executive Order
No. 11,246 lacks presidential authority despite Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (upholding "Philadelphia Plan" relating
to minority hiring under the authority of the Order); United States v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S.
942 (1978) (upholding the Order); and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(upholding voluntary affriative action plan). See Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way: The
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plied basis of congressional support for presidential authority to
issue Executive Order No. 12,044.158
None of the above theories of implied presidential authority
can be applied to support a similar finding of implied authority for
Executive Order No. 12,067. Finding authority for Executive Order
No. 11,246 was a simple task in light of the President's well-recog-
nized authority over procurement matters. In contrast, no similar
intrinsic presidential power can be relied upon to support the sub-
stantial expansion of EEOC functions beyond those created by
Congress or to abolish the congressionally created Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Coordinating Council.
In further contrast to Executive Orders Nos. 11,246 and
12,044, no express indication of congressional intent can be relied
upon to imply authority for Executive Order No. 12,067. In sup-
port of Executive Order No. 11,246, a federal district court recently
was able to rely on the legislative history underlying Title VII and
upon the language of Title VII itself to find a clear implication of
congressional intent to utilize federal procurement powers as an
enforcement device.15' In a similar fashion, Professor Bruff relied
upon congressional expressions of concern with regard to ensuring
that executive agencies perform as required in order to find an im-
plication of authority for Executive Order No. 12,044.155 By con-
trast, there is nothing in the legislative history or language of the
ADEA, in the Reorganization Act, or in the EEOC's organic legis-
lation from which to imply presidential authority to create a
"super agency" charged with enforcing and overseeing the nation's
equal employment opportunity laws.
Absent such implied authority, it appears that President
Carter acted in excess of his authority in promulgating section 6 of
the Plan and in issuing Executive Order No. 12,067. Although the
issue of presidential authority for this portion of the Plan may be
insulated from judicial review by the fact of congressional acquies-
cence, it remains subject to further legislative consideration.
Case for Delimiting Presidential Power Under Executive Order No. 11246, 33 VAN-. L.
Rav. 921 (1980).
153. Bruff, supra note 145, at 489-91. Professor Bruff reviews presidential power as it
relates to administrative rulemaking and cogently argues for implied presidential authority
to promulgate Executive Order No. 12,044, entitled "Improved Government Regulations." 3
C.F.R. 152 (1979 Compilation).
154. See note 152 supra.
155. Bruff, supra note 145, at 490.
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Other Legislation
A second statute,- in addition to the ADEA, dealing with age
discrimination is the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.158 While this
Act's application is limited to federally-assisted programs and its
general implications are over-shadowed by the ADEA, its prohibi-
tion is far more sweeping. Section 303 of the Act provides: "no per-
son in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 157 As a consequence of the law's somewhat
unusual requirement that although enacted in 1975 it was not to
take effect until January 1, 1979,158 it has not received wide recog-
nition. Final implementing regulations were published in the Fed-
eral Register for March 21, 1979,'s5 and are now a part of the Code
of Federal Regulations.'8 0 This law's impact on age discrimination
is quite limited because matters of employment discrimination are
specifically removed from the statute.161 When, however, the fed-
eral funding for a particular program has as its object and purpose
support for employment, such as training programs, the Act would
apply in full force to age discrimination in affected employment. 162
Conclusion
Whether the original purposes of the Reorganization Plan as
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). This Act is also known as the
Age Discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs Act, or commonly as the "other age dis-
crimination" act.
157. Id. § 6102.
158. Id. § 6103(a)(5).
159. 44 Fed. Reg. 17,162 (1979).
160. 45 C.F.R. § 90 (1980).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1976) provides: "(1) Except with respect to any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance for public service employment under the Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act of 1974 ... nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to authorize action under this chapter by any Federal department or agency with
respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organiza-
tion, or with respect to any labor-management joint apprenticeship training program; (2)
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to amend or modify the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 . . .or to affect the rights or responsibilities of any person or
party pursuant to such Act."
162. Id. While most employment discrimination situations are excluded, Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act programs, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (1976 & Supp. I
1979), continue to be included.
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stated by President Carter ultimately will be achieved remains an
open question. Other than an increasing emphasis upon Title VII
interpretations in all age discrimination cases, little immediate
change in enforcement of age discrimination in employment stat-
utes can be anticipated as a result of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1978. As EEOC internal reorganization progresses and additional
appropriations are made, however, an increase in the volume of age
discrimination charges under ADEA is quite likely to occur. These
increases may be in tandem form, an ADEA charge coupled with a
Title VII charge.
Fundamental differences exist between the groups harmed by
age discrimination and the groups protected under Title VII.
Therefore, an effort towards uniformity in interpretation consis-
tent with principles developed under Title VII may not result in
the most effective, equitable, or purposeful enforcement of the
ADEA. Moreover, the Reorganization Plan raises serious questions
of presidential authority to fashion an organization having the ca-
pacity to exceed the collective powers of the agencies whose func-
tions it assumed.
Establishing a single federal agency to deal with all situations
of employment discrimination, including age, is a desirable goal. A
consideration of the disparity in types of discrimination and the
situations in which each type occurs leads to the conclusion that
the most effective method to achieve this goal is through congres-
sional hearings and implementing legislation, so that the coordina-
tion effort is subject to a comprehensive analysis facilitated by the
forces of practical confrontation found in the legislative process.
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Appendix A
REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 1978
43 Fed. Reg. 19807, 92 Stat. 3781
Prepared by the President and transmitted to the Senate and the
House of Representatives in Congress assembled, February 23,
1978, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 9 of Title 5 of the
United States Code.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
SECTION 1. TRANSFER OF EQUAL PAY ENFORCEMENT
FUNCTIONS
All functions related to enforcing or administering Section
6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C.
206(d)), are hereby transferred to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. Such functions include, but shall not be lim-
ited to, the functions relating to equal pay administration and en-
forcement now vested in the Secretary of Labor, the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, and
the Civil Service Commission pursuant to Sections 4(d)(1); 4(f); 9;
11 (a), (b), and (c); 16(b) and (c) and 17 of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 204(d)(1); 204(f); 209; 211(a),
(b), and (c); 216(b) and (c) and 217) and Section 10(b)(1) of the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 259).
SEC. 2. TRANSFER OF AGE DISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT
FUNCTIONS
All functions vested in the Secretary of Labor or in the Civil
Service Commission pursuant to Sections 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, and 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, as amended, (29 U.S.C. 621, 623, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631,
632, 633, and 633a) are hereby transferred to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. All functions related to age dis-
crimination administration and enforcement pursuant to Sections
6 and 16 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, (29 U.S.C. 625 and 634) are hereby transferred to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
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SEC. 3. TRANSFER OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS
(a) All equal opportunity in Federal employment enforcement
and related functions vested in the Civil Service Commission pur-
suant to Section 717(b) and (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(b) and (c)), are hereby transferred
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
(b) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may
delegate to the Civil Service Commission or its successor the func-
tion of making p preliminary determination on the issue of dis-
crimination whenever, as a part of a complaint or appeal before the
Civil Service Commission on other grounds, a Federal employee al-
leges a violation of Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) provided that the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission retains the function of making the
final determination concerning such issue of discrimination.
SEC. 4. TRANSFER OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT OF HANDICAPPED
INDIVIDUALS ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS
All Federal employment of handicapped individuals enforce-
ment functions and related functions vested in the Civil Service
Commission pursuant to Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) are hereby transferred to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. The function of being co-chairman
of the Interagency Committee on Handicapped Employees now
vested in the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission pursuant
to Section 501 is hereby transferred to the Chairman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
SEC. 5. TRANSFER OF PUBLIC SECTOR 707 FUNCTIONS
Any function of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion concerning initiation of litigation with respect to State or local
government, or political subdivisions under Section 707 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C. 2000e:
6) and all necessary functions related thereto, including investiga-
tion, findings, notice and an opportunity to resolve the matter
without contested litigation, are hereby transferred to the Attorney
General, to be exercised by him in accordance with procedures
consistent with said Title VII. The Attorney General is authorized
to delegate any function under Section 707 of said Title VII to any
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officer or employee of the Department of Justice.
SEC. 6. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND ABOLITION OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COORDINATING COUNCIL
All functions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordi-
nating Council, which was established pursuant to Section 715 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, (42 U.S.C. 2000e-14), are
hereby transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission. The Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Coun-
cil is hereby abolished.
SEC. 7. SAVINGS PROVISION
Administrative proceedings including administrative appeals
from the acts of an executivb agency (as defined by Section 105 of
Title 5 of the United States Code) commenced or being conducted
by or against such executive agency will not abate by reason of the
taking effect of this Plan. Consistent with the provisions of this
Plan, all such proceedings shall continue before the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission otherwise unaffected by the trans-
fers provided by this Plan. Consistent with the provisions of this
Plan, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall ac-
cept appeals from those executive agency actions which occurred
prior to the effective date of this Plan in accordance with law and
regulations in effect on such effective date. Nothing herein shall
affect any right of any person to judicial review under applicable
law.
SEC. 8. INCIDENTAL TRANSFERS
So much of the personnel, property, records and unexpended
balances of appropriations, allocations and other funds employed,
used, held, available, or to be made available in connection with
the functions transferred under this Plan, as the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall determine, shall be trans-
ferred to the appropriate department, agency, or component at
such time or times as the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall provide, except that no such unexpended bal-
ances transferred shall be used for purposes other than those for
which the appropriation was originally made. The Director of the
Office of Management and Budget shall provide for terminating
the affairs of the Council abolished herein and for such further
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measures and dispositions as such Director deems necessary to ef-
fectuate the purposes of this Reorganization Plan.
SEC. 9. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Reorganization Plan shall become effective at such time
or times, on or before October 1, 1979, as the President shall spec-
ify, but not sooner than the earliest time allowable under Section
906 of Title 5 of the United States Code.
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT
To the Congress of the United States:
I am submitting to you today Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1978. This Plan makes the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission the principal Federal agency in fair employment enforce-
ment. Together with actions I shall take by Executive Order, it
consolidates Federal equal employment opportunity activities and
lays, for the first time, the foundation of a unified, coherent Fed-
eral structure to combat job discrimination in all its forms.
In 1940 President Roosevelt issued the first Executive Order
forbidding discrimination in employment by the Federal govern-
ment. Since that time the Congress, the courts and the Executive
Branch-spurred by the courage and sacrifice of many people and
organizations-have taken historic steps to extend equal employ-
ment opportunity protection throughout the private as well as
public sector. But each new prohibition against discrimination un-
fortunately has brought with it a further dispersal of Federal equal
employment opportunity responsibility. This fragmentation of au-
thority among a number of Federal agencies has meant confusion
and ineffective enforcement for employees, regulatory duplication
and needless expense for employers.
Fair employment is too vital for haphazard enforcement. My
Administration will aggressively enforce our civil rights laws. Al-
though discrimination in any area has severe consequences, limit-
ing economic opportunity affects access to education, housing and
health care. I, therefore, ask you to join with me to reorganize ad-
ministration of the civil rights laws and to begin that effort by re-
organizing the enforcement of those laws which ensure an equal
opportunity to a job.
Eighteen government units now exercise important responsi-
bilities under statutes, Executive Orders and regulations relating
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to equal employment opportunity:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [section 2000e et
seq. of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare], which bans em-
ployment discrimination based on race, national origin, sex or re-
ligion. The EEOC acts on individual complaints and also initiates
private sector cases involving a "pattern or practice" of
discrimination.
The Department of Labor and 11 other agencies enforce Exec-
utive Order 11246 [set out as a note under section 2000e of Title
42]. This prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, national origin, sex, or religion and requires affirmative action
by government contractors. While the Department now coordi-
nates enforcement of this "contract compliance" program, it is ac-
tually administered by eleven other departments and agencies. The
Department also administers those statutes requiring contractors
to take affirmative action to employ handicapped people, disabled
veterans and Vietnam veterans.
In addition, the Labor Department enforces the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 [section 206(d) of Title 29, Labor], which prohibits em-
ployers from paying unequal wages based on sex, and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 [section 621 et seq. of Ti-
tle 29], which forbids age discrimination against persons between
the ages of 40 and 65.
The Department of Justice litigates Title VII cases involving
public sector employers-State and local governments. The De-
partment also represents the Federal government in lawsuits
against Federal contractors and grant recipients who are in viola-
tion of Federal nondiscrimination prohibitions.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) enforces Title VII and
all other nondiscrimination and affirmative action requirements for
Federal employment. The CSC rules on complaints filed by indi-
viduals and monitors affirmative action plans submitted annually
by other Federal agencies.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council
includes representatives from EEOC, Labor, Justice, CSC and the
Civil Rights Commission. It is charged with coordinating the Fed-
eral equal employment opportunity enforcement effort and with
eliminating overlap and inconsistent standards.
In addition to these major government units, other agencies
enforce various equal employment opportunity requirements which
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apply to specific grant programs. The Department of Treasury, for
example, administers the anti-discrimination prohibitions applica-
ble to recipients of revenue sharing funds.
These programs have had only limited success. Some of the
past deficiencies include:
-inconsistent standards of compliance;
-duplicative, inconsistent paperwork requirements and investi-
gative efforts;
-conflicts within agencies between their program responsibilities
and their responsibility to enforce the civil rights laws;
-confusion on the part of workers about how and where to seek
redress;
-lack of accountability.
I am proposing today a series of steps to bring coherence to
the equal employment enforcement effort. These steps, to be ac-
complished by the Reorganization Plan and Executive Orders, con-
stitute an important step toward consolidation of equal employ-
ment opportunity enforcement. They will be implemented over the
next two years, so that the agencies involved may continue their
internal reform.
Its experience and broad scope make the EEOC suitable for
the role of principal Federal agency in fair employment enforce-
ment. Located in the Executive Branch and responsible to the
President, the EEOC has developed considerable expertise in the
field of employment discrimination since Congress created it by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [section 2000e-4 of Title 42]. The
Commission has played a pioneer role in defining both employ-
ment discrimination and its appropriate remedies.
While it has had management problems in past administra-
tions, the EEOC's new leadership is making substantial progress in
correcting them. In the last seven months the Commission has re-
designed its internal structures and adopted proven management
techniques. Early experience with these procedures indicates a
high degree of success in reducing and expediting new cases. At my
direction, the Office of Management and Budget is actively assist-
ing the EEOC to ensure that these reforms continue.
The Reorganization Plan I am submitting will accomplish the
following:
On July 1, 1978, abolish the Equal Employment Opportunity
Coordinating Council (42 U.S.C. 2000e-14) and transfer its duties
to the EEOC (no positions or funds shifted).
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On October 1, 1978, shift enforcement of equal employment
opportunity for Federal employees from the CSC to the EEOC
(100 positions and $6.5 million shifted).
On July 1, 1979, shift responsibility for enforcing both the
Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
from the Labor Department to the EEOC (198 positions and $5.3
million shifted for Equal Pay; 119 positions and $3.5 million for
Age Discrimination).
Clarify the Attorney General's authority to initiate "pattern or
practice" suits under Title VII in the public sector.
In addition, I will issue an Executive Order on October 1,
1978, to consolidate the contract compliance program-now the re-
sponsibility of Labor and eleven "compliance agencies"-into the
Labor Department (1,517 positions and $33.1 million shifted).
These proposed transfers and consolidations reduce from
fifteen to three the number of Federal agencies having important
equal employment opportunity responsibilities under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Federal contract compliance
provisions.
Each element of my Plan is important to the success of the
entire proposal.
By abolishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinat-
ing Council and transferring its responsibilities to the EEOC, this
plan places the Commission at the center of equal employment op-
portunity enforcement. With these new responsibilities, the EEOC
can give coherence and direction to the government's efforts by de-
veloping strong uniform enforcement standards to apply through-
out the government: standardized data collection procedures, joint
training programs, programs to ensure the sharing of enforcement
related data among agencies, and methods and priorities for com-
plaint and compliance reviews. Such direction has been absent in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating- Council.
It should be stressed, however, that affected agencies will be
consulted before EEOC takes any action. When the Plan has been
approved, I intend to issue an Executive Order which will provide
for consultation, as well as a procedure for reviewing major dis-
puted issues within the Executive Office of the President. The At-
torney General's responsibility to advise the Executive Branch on
legal issues will also be preserved.
Transfer of the Civil Service Commission's equal employment
opportunity responsibilities to EEOC is needed to ensure that: (1)
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Federal employees have the same rights and remedies as those in
the private sector and in State and local government; (2) Federal
agencies meet the same standards as are required of other employ-
ers; and (3) potential conflicts between an agency's equal employ-
ment opportunity and personnel management functions are mini-
mized. The Federal government must not fall below the standard
of performance it expects of private employers.
The Civil Service Commission has in the past been lethargic in
enforcing fair employment requirements within the Federal gov-
ernment. While the Chairman and other Commissioners I have ap-
pointed have already demonstrated their personal commitment to
expanding equal employment opportunity, responsibility for ensur-
ing fair employment for Federal employees should rest ultimately
with the EEOC.
We must ensure that the transfer in no way undermines the
important objectives of the comprehensive civil service reorganiza-
tion which will be submitted to Congress in the near future. When
the two plans take effect, I will direct the EEOC and the CSC to
coordinate their procedures to prevent any duplication and
overlap.
The Equal Pay Act now administered by the Labor Depart-
ment, prohibits employers from paying unequal wages based on
sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which is enforced by EEOC,
contains a broader ban on sex discrimination. The transfer of
Equal Pay responsibility from the Labor Department to the EEOC
will minimize overlap and centralize enforcement of statutory
prohibitions against sex discrimination in employment.
The transfer will strengthen efforts to combat sex discrimina-
tion. Such efforts would be enhanced still further by passage of the
legislation pending before you, which I support, that would pro-
hibit employers from excluding women disabled by pregnancy from
participating in disability programs.
There is now virtually complete overlap in the employers, la-
bor organizations, and employment agencies covered by Title VII
and by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. This overlap is
burdensome to employers and confusing to victims of discrimina-
tion. The proposed transfer of the age discrimination program
from the Labor Department to the EEOC will eliminate the
duplication.
The Plan I am proposing will not affect the Attorney General's
responsibility to enforce Title VII against State or local govern-
May 1981] LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT 1191
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ments or to represent the Federal government in suits against Fed-
eral contractors and grant recipients. In 1972, the Congress deter-
mined that the Attorney General should be involved in suits
against State and local governments. This proposal reinforces that
judgment and clarifies the Attorney General's authority to initiate
litigation against State or local governments engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of discrimination. This in no way diminishes the
EEOC's existing authority to investigate complaints filed against
State or local governments and, where appropriate, to refer them
to the Attorney General. The Justice Department and the EEOC
will cooperate so that the Department sues on valid referrals, as
well as on its own "pattern or practice" cases.
A critical element of my proposals will be accomplished by Ex-
ecutive Order rather than by the Reorganization Plan. This in-
volves consolidation in the Labor Department of the responsibility
to ensure that Federal contractors comply with Executive Order
11246. Consolidation will achieve the following: promote consistent
standards, procedures, and reporting requirements; remove con-
tractors from the jurisdiction of multiple agencies; prevent an
agency's equal employment objectives from being outweighed by
its procurement and construction objectives; and produce more ef-
fective law enforcement through unification of planning, training
and sanctions. By 1981, after I have had an opportunity to review
the manner in which both the EEOC and the Labor Department
are exercising their new responsibilities, I will determine whether
further action is appropriate.
Finally, the responsibility for enforcing grant-related equal
employment provisions will remain with the agencies administering
the grant programs. With the EEOC acting as coordinator of Fed-
eral equal employment programs, we will be able to bring overlap
and duplication to a minimum. We will be able, for example, to see
that a university's employment practices are not subject to dupli-
cative investigations under both Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 [section 1681 et seq. of Title 20, Education] and the
contract compliance program. Because of the similarities between
the Executive Order program and those statutes requiring Federal
contractors to take affirmative action to employ handicapped indi-
viduals and disabled and Vietnam veterans, I have determined
that enforcement of these statutes should remain in the Labor
Department.
Each of the changes set forth in the Reorganization Plan ac-
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companying this message is necessary to accomplish one or more of
the purposes set forth in Section 901(a) of Title 5 of the United
States Code. I have taken care to determine that all functions
abolished by the Plan are done only under the statutory authority
provided by Section 903(b) of Title 5 of the United States Code.
I do not anticipate that the reorganizations contained in this
Plan will result in any significant change in expenditures. They
will result in a more efficient and manageable enforcement
program.
The Plan I am submitting is moderate and measured. It gives
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-an agency dedi-
cated solely to this purpose-the primary Federal responsibility in
the area of job discrimination, but it is designed to give this agency
sufficient time to absorb its new responsibilities. This reorganiza-
tion will produce consistent agency standards, as well as increased
accountability. Combined with the intense commitment of those
charged with these responsibilities, it will become possible for us to
accelerate this Nation's progress in ensuring equal job opportuni-
ties for all our people.
JIMY CARTER.
THE WHTE HousE, February 23, 1978.
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